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The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Syria-Iran Relations 
 
Özden Zeynep Oktav♣ 
 
After the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish 
foreign policy underwent changes which were significant enough to raise question 
marks with its Western allies’ regarding whether Turkey has ceased to be a part of the 
West and international society. Turkish foreign policy makers started to change the 
Cold War mentality, which urged Turkey to have a ‘faith’ in the West without 
questioning its norms, values, policies and conduct. This change of style and 
substance in Turkish foreign policy became most evident with the improving of 
relations with Syria and Iran who had uneasy or hostile relations with the West. 
However, with the outburst of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Turkey was caught 
off guard and the mass demonstrations on the Arab streets forced Ankara to reshape 
its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world. Put differently, the Arab spring 
became a litmus test for Ankara’s policies of playing to the Arab streets as well as its 
relations with Syria and Iran. While it lent quick support for popular movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt, where Turkish investments were relatively limited, Ankara’s first 
reaction to the uprising in Syria, where Turkish economic and political investments 
were both substantial, was more cautious and it prioritised stability and gradual 
reform. However, Ankara gradually reversed its policy and ended up calling for 
Asad’s overthrow; moreover, as against its early distancing of Turkey from the West, 
Ankara now sought to enlist the West in dealing with the Syrian regime. 
Apprehensions of Turkey’s ambitions vis-ᾲ-vis Syria’s civil war increased 
significantly because of its policy of activism which lent support to Muslim 
Brotherhood which dominated the Syrian National Council, the opposition coalition 
against the Asad regime. Turkey was seen or portrayed as a country following pro 
Sunni policies especially by the West. 
                                                
♣ This article was written within the framwork of a scholarship granted by The Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK)  2219 BIDEB, Ankara, Turkey. 
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 After a brief survey of improving relations with Syria and Iran, this article sets out 
to examine the triangle of Turkey-Syria-Iran relations after the outburst of Syria’s 
civil war, focusing on the following questions: What were the reasons for Turkey’s 
move to cooperate with the West in dealing with the Syrian crisis in spite of it 
sacrificing, in the process, its good neighborhood relations with both Syria and Iran?  
What is the impact of the Syrian crisis on Turkey-Iran relations? What were the 
priorities and the miscalculations of Ankara in dealing with problems stemming from 
Syria’s civil war? In addition, the article will discuss the duality and ambivalence of 
Turkey-Iran relations which increasingly become evident after the significant changes 
taking place in the region such as the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS) in Iraq’s Western provinces and Turkey becoming the biggest ally of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), breaking in this respect not only from Iran and 
Iraq but also the United States. The reasons why Turkey and Iran maintain cordial 
relations in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis despite so many divergences of interests 
will also be among the concerns of the study.  
 
Ups and Downs in Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran 
In parallel with Turkey’s post 2002 tilting towards regional alliances as an alternative 
to relations with global actors, principally the United States and the European Union, 
Turkey adopted a bridge country role between East and West so as to balance its 
relations between the West/Israel on one hand and Syria/Iran on the other. However, 
with the renewed hostilities in Gaza at the end of 2008, Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan who felt a ‘sense of betrayal’ by Israel after his mediating efforts between 
Israel and Syria employed very harsh rhetoric towards Israel. This marked a new era 
in Turkish foreign policy because Ankara, made it evident that it dropped its previous 
balancing policy between the East and the West. Instead, it would prioritise “zero-
problems” with its regional neighbours. 
 
Deepening Economic Relations with Syria and Iran 
Ankara had signed 51 protocols with Syria by March 2010. 1  This was a 
groundbreaking development in bilateral relations because those protocols, which are 
                                                
1 With the September 16, 2009 Treaty, visa requirements were lifted and the first ministerial meeting 
of  the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council which was held with the participation 
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based on the slogan of “common destiny, history and future,” (“Al-qadar al-
mushtarak, Ettarikh al-mushtarak, Al-mustaqbal al-mushtarak”) aimed at economic 
integration and at the same time inflamed a hot debate concerning Turkey’s shift of 
axis.  Erdoğan, “referring to the ongoing debates as to whether Turkey was shifting its 
axis in foreign policy, said: “the focus is not shifting but rather the focus of Turkish 
foreign policy is normalizing.” (Tur 2010) Turkish officials emphasised that it was 
trade, rather than politics, which determined the new contours of Turkish foreign 
policy. For example, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu commented that the lifting 
of visas with Syria as “the first step of turning economic cooperation into economic 
unity” (Gürcanlı 2009). In a similar vein, Turkey tried to create a common free trade 
area by negotiating High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils with Jordan, Iraq and 
Lebanon as well as Syria. In parallel with increasing efforts to enhance trade relations 
with Syria, Ankara also increased its trade volume with Iran to $ 10 billion annually. 
 Not only did Turkey’s exports to Iran double, but also Turkey became quite 
dependent on Iranian oil and gas2 (Associated Press 2009).  Exports to Iran rose more 
than seven-fold, from $300 million to $2 billion, between 2002-2009 (TSIDICG 
2010, 6). Turkey’s efforts, together with Brazil, to prevent the application of UN 
sanctions on Iran in 2010, should be read against this background. Ankara’s 
increasing trade relations with Iran has become completely incompatible with the US 
policy of bringing Iran to heel.  The mutual distrust between Ankara and Washington 
became more evident as the US pressured Turkey to put sanctions into effect. 
Washington was increasingly uneasy about the probability that Turkey could emerge 
as a new safety net for Iranian business as the Turkish government insisted that it 
would abide by UN sanctions but not the more sweeping restrictions imposed on 
Tehran by the US and the European Union (Khalaf and Strauss 2010). Ankara’s 
reluctance to apply the sanctions of individual countries and Turkish official circles’ 
suspicions concerning the application of sanctions by EU and American companies 
manifest Turkey’s distrust of the West and its enthusiasm to be an independent 
regional actor. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
of ten ministers  on October 13, 2009 aimed exchange on  trade, development and education (Ayhan 
2009, 30; Turkish NY 2009). 
2 “Turkey receives 18 million cubic meters per day from Iran, making Iran the second largest supplier 
of gas to Turkey after Russia” (Associated Press 2009). 
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Setbacks to Turkey’s Zero-Problems Policy 
Towards the end of 2010, however, two developments clarified the limits of Turkey’s 
capability of continuing its good neighborhood policy and being an independent actor 
in the international system dominated by the United States. One was the deployment 
of the missile defense system under NATO’s command on Turkish territory and of 
the early warning radar system in Malatya Kürecik on the 19-20 November 2010.3  
Turkey’s consent to participate in a defense mechanism that was believed by many to 
be against Iran, was perceived as an example of the JDP Government’s difficulty of 
following good neighborhood relations at the expense of its relations with the global 
actors, especially the United States (Özalp 2010). Although Ankara declared that the 
system did not target Iranian nuclear sites, the US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s 
statement that the purpose of the US radar system to be installed in eastern Turkey 
was to defend against Iranian missiles, inflicted collateral damage on Turkey-Iran 
relations.4 In addition, the arguments concerning the sharing of intelligence between 
Turkey and Israel from the US radar system in Turkey, which is similar to the one in 
Israel’s Negev Desert, further strained Iranian-Turkish relations.5  The Iranian Chief 
of the General Staff’s threatening words6 manifested the damage done to relations 
with Iran. 
 The second development that crystallised the unsustainability of Turkey’s policy 
of balancing between its Western alliance and its good neighbor policy was the 
outburst of the Arab spring. Especially the Libyan rebellion became a litmus test for 
Turkey’s institutional relations with the West. At first, Turkey, a NATO member, 
objected to military interference in Libya, mainly because it would jeopardise 
lucrative construction contracts in Libya and its large investments in the country. 
Turkish president Gül openly stated Ankara’s suspicions concerning the hidden 
                                                
3 Gürsel, K. (2010, November 21). AKP Dış Politikası Lizbon’da İflas Etti. Milliyet. 
4 China Daily, “Panetta to Visit Turkey Over Shield Plan,” 14 Aralık 2011, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-12/14/content_14266117.htm Kadri Gürsel, “Füze 
Kalkanının Eğrisi Doğrusu,” Milliyet, October9, 2011. 
5 Metin Münir, İran’ın Erdoğan’a Sunduğu Fırsat, Milliyet, 18 Ekim 2012.  
6 “Turkey will be next in line for violence after Syria if it continues to work on behalf of Western 
interests,” İran “Genel Kurmay Başkanı Hasan Firuzabadi: Sıra Türkiye’ye gelir, “ Star, August 28, 
2012.  
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agenda of the coalition forces whose main partners were the United States and EU.7  
However, in the face of the increasing support given to the Libyan rebels by the 
Western countries, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Tripoli and recognised the 
rebel Transnational National Council. 8 
 
The Syrian Civil War and Turkey 
With the outbreak of Syrian uprisings and the Asad regime’s indifference to Turkey’s 
warnings to stop its crackdown on opposition protests, Ankara took care not to make 
a mistake similar to that in the Libyan case, (of following the same anti western 
policy). Ankara officially declared that it would interfere in what was happening in 
Syria, a dramatic shift from its traditional principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs of a neighboring country. Erdoğan openly stated that what was happening in 
Syria was an internal Turkish matter and he had run out of patience (Bugün 2011). 
 There were three motives behind Ankara’s shift from its non-interference policy 
after the outburst of the Syrian uprisings: first, was to show that Ankara was no 
longer out of the orbit of the West; second, on the assumption that the West would 
rapidly depose Asad as it had done Qaddafi, to assure itself a place at the table that 
would negotiate the new regional order in the post-Asad period, and third, and most 
important of all, because the Syrian civil war would lead to a flood of Syrian refugees 
so as to endanger Turkish-Syrian borders, and would make them a backdoor for 
Kurdish terrorism. 
 Ankara firmly believed that a political transition from the Asad regime was 
essential to resolving the conflict. Turkey, hoping to bring the regime to the 
negotiating table, empowered Syrian opposition elements, allowing them to organise 
and convene in Turkey, as well as hosting defectors from the Syrian military and 
                                                
7 Turkish president Abdullah Gül stated on a TV channel: “some coalition governments have ulterior 
motives and Libya could be "looted" as Iraq had been. Because the aim (of coalition forces) is not the 
liberation of the Libyan people. There are hidden agendas and differing interests”,2011, TV 24. 23 
March. Gül: Libya'yla ilgili bazı ülkeler fırsatçılık içinde. Retrieved May 14, 2011, from TV 24: 
viewed  22 December 2012,  <http://www.yirmidort.tv/dunya/gul-libya-yla-ilgili-bazi-ulkeler-
firsatcilik-icinde-haber-27719.htm> 
8 Habibi N. & W. Walker, J. 2011, ‘Turkey’s Grand Miscalculation on Libya’, 6 March, Boston.com, 
viewed 18 December 2012, 
<http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle/2011/03/turkeys_grand_m.ht
ml> 
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reportedly allowing the Free Syrian Army to set up their headquarters in the south 
east of the country.9 In addition, Ankara, aiming to strangle Syria’s economy and 
severely diminish the power of the Asad government, decided to freeze assets of 
officials involved in the government's crackdown on the uprising, suspended its ties 
with the nation's central bank and banned all military sales.10 Turkey also helped 
forge an international “Friends of Syria” coalition to secure regime change. All these 
efforts, however, were ineffective and moreover deepened Turkey’s mistrust of its 
Western allies, the EU and the United States who followed low profile policies 
towards Syria. 
 First of all, Ankara understood that Washington was not willing to shoulder 
responsibility for the Syrian crisis and take bold initiatives such as setting up a 
"buffer zone" inside Syria to protect refugees fleeing President Bashar al-Asad's 
forces, which would have entailed direct intervention in the year-long revolt.11 
 Second, that the UN and Washington would not favor a military solution became 
evident towards the end of the first anniversary of the Syrian uprising. Turkey was 
disappointed by “the negligent U.S. attitude toward the Syrian regime, and the fact 
that Washington has not offered diplomatic, political, financial, or logistical support 
to the revolution in equal measure to what Russia has given the Syrian regime.”12 
 Thus, a hot debate was inflamed in Turkish media whether Turkey was left alone 
by international society in its struggle against the Syrian regime, which had 
committed crimes against civilians. 13  The lack of international consensus 14 and 
Russia’s standing by Asad “to rebuff what it sees as Western plots to induce regime 
                                                
9 Nuh Yılmaz, Syria: The View from Turkey,  European Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 2013, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_syria_the_view_from_turkey139 
 
11 Asli Aydintasbas, “Davutoglu’ndan ABD’ye: Humus Sarajevo Olmasin”, Milliyet, February 13, 
2012.  
12 Zagros Osman, “Syrian revolution and Washington’s Miscalculations”, Fıkra Forum, May 17, 2012, 
accessible at http://fikraforum.org/?p=2241  
13 Semih Idiz, “Turkiye Suriye’de Yalniz Kalmamali”, Milliyet, March 31, 2012. “Türkiye Stratejisinde 
Yollar Ayriliyor, Turkiye’nin Planina Veto”, Milliyet, March 25, 2012. 
14 “Ankara accused the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of indirectly supporting the 
oppression of the Syrian people by failing to unite on Syria.” Semih Idiz, “Ankara BM’nin Suriye 
Surecine Karsi Soguk”, Milliyet, March 26, 2012. 
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change in countries friendly to Russia had a negative impact on Turkey’s efforts to 
realise regime change in Syria.”15 Partly due to the increasing critiques in the Turkish 
media that Turkey was left alone and that it had pushed for a military intervention by 
the United States against Syria,16 top Turkish officials declared at the beginning of the 
second year of the Uprising that Turkey would not interfere in the Syrian uprising 
militarily; instead, they would seek a solution based on diplomacy that would include 
Iran, China and Russia. 17  Thus, in parallel with its increasing disappointment 
regarding Washington’s passive role towards Syria, NATO’s inactivity 18  and 
Moscow’s blocking of United Nations moves, Ankara made serious modifications of 
its Syria policy and initiated the “triple negotiation system”19 which would bring 
together Turkey, Egypt and Iran; Turkey, Russia and Iran; and Turkey, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia to work separately toward a solution in Syria. The involvement of 
Russia and Iran not only made it clear that Asad's regime, if not Asad, would have a 
place at the negotiating table but also made it evident that Turkey was seeking 
alliances alternative to the Western one to find a diplomatic solution to the war. This 
change in Ankara’s policy was owing, not only to the realization that the West would 
not intervene, but also that a unilateral Turkish military intervention in Syria would 
be costly since Asad had dual Russo-Iranian support. Instead, Ankara sought 
agreements with Russia and Iran to be able to ensure its border security in the face of 
                                                
15 Erol Cebeci and Kadir Üstün, “The Syrian Quagmire: What is Holding Turkey Back?”, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 14, No.2, 2012, p. 20. 
16 Can Dundar, “Sam Amca Seni Iteliyor”, Milliyet, April 12, 2012. For example, Hillary Clinton 
declared ‘we expect the regime change process in Syria will be realised without violence under the 
leadership of the Arab League and Turkey’ (Hürriyet 20 November 2011). 
17 “For example, Turkish President, Gul stated that Turkey favored a solution based on diplomacy and 
opposed any foreign intervention to Syria,”“BM’nin Son Kararını Tasvip Etmiyoruz”, Hurriyet, March 
25, 2012 and Semih Idiz, “Ankara’nin Kafasi Suriye Konusunda Karisikk Gorunuyor”, Milliyet, March 
10, 2012. 
18 “Rasmussen said the Western alliance had no intention of intervening in Syria even in the event of a 
U.N. mandate to protect civilians, and urged Middle East countries to find a way to end the spiraling 
violence.” Reuters, NATO to Stay out of Syria Even If UN Mandate Emerges, February 17, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/us-syria-nato-idUSTRE81G0ZF20120217 accessed 12 Oct. 
2013 
19 Semih İdiz, Turkey’s New Strategy could Broker Force, Almonitor, October 20, 2012, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/vision-and-imagination-
required-over-syria.html accessed 12 October 2013. 
Syria Studies    
 
8 
 
increasing border violations. Last but not least, Ankara became aware that military 
intervention could lead to internationalization of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. 20 
 However, Turkey, whose ultimate aim was to ensure border stability as well as 
toppling the regime, found that it could not control the spillover of the Syrian conflict. 
As the border violations and explosions on its borders such as those in Ceylanpınar, 
Akçakale and Reyhanlı increased in number and severity. Ankara took further 
measures and declared new engagements rules. According to those rules, “any 
military instruments or troops approaching to the Turkish borders from the Syrian 
side in the form of a threat would be perceived as military threats” and would be 
militarily countered...” 21  Moreover, Ankara found, over time that it had new 
unwelcome neighbours along its 900 km border with Syria. One was the Jihadist 
groups such as Al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the 
other was the Democratic Union Party “Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat”, (PYD), the 
Syrian branch of the PKK. 
 
New Neighbours, New Threat Perceptions 
With the emergence of the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and al-Qaeda-
inspired fighters who took advantage of the power vacuum to fight for control of key 
northern Syrian towns, Ankara was exposed to new threats and new accusations. It 
was alleged that Ankara was providing members of radical Islamist groups with 
medical care in Turkish hospitals and supplying them with arms and ammunition, 
because those groups had been fighting against the PYD22 whom Asad promised to 
give autonomy in an area covering six districts in the region, including Haseki, Ras 
al-Ain, Afrin, Darbasiyya, Ainal-Araband, and Kamishli. 23  From Ankara’s 
perspective, at a time when Turkey has been in an effort to make peace with its own 
                                                
20  Unver, H. A. 2012, ‘Turkey’s Syria Calculations: Kurdish Dimension’, Foreign Policy Association, 
22 March. 
21 Kareem Fahim and Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Says It Shot Down Syrian Military Helicopter Flying in Its 
Airspace, The New York Times,  September 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/turkey-syria.html?_r=0 accessed October 13, 2013. 
22 Amberin Zaman, Syrian Kurdish Leader Urges Turkey  To End Support for Salafists, Al Monitor,  
October 9, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/syrian-kurdish-leader-calls-
turkey-shut-down-salafists.html accessed October 13, 2013. 
23 Today’s Zaman, Turkey warns Syrian PYD against seeking autonomy, July 19, 2013. 
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Kurds in Turkey, the PYD’s aspirations to gain autonomy, aiming at a probable 
independent Kurdish state which would have access to the Mediterranean, was 
unacceptable. In a region under PYD control, the PKK would have the ability to 
establish a strong foothold and lead to a serious border security issue for Turkey. 
 In this context, Ankara was accused of turning a blind eye to the presence of 
jihadist groups on Turkish territory and using those groups to suppress the Syrian 
Kurds’ aspirations and not only by the PYD but also by Washington. While the 
Obama administration had encouraged a broad Syrian opposition coalition, in which 
the influence of Islamists would be circumscribed, from Washington’s perspective, 
the Turkish government continued to throw its weight behind the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood dominated the Syrian National Council, which was 
headquartered in Istanbul, and succeeded in eclipsing other groups within the new 
opposition coalition, effectively thwarting the American effort to empower non-
Islamists. 24 
 In a nutshell, the war in Syria assumed a totally different dimension, no longer 
one against a brutal dictator for the sake of democracy, but over whether Syria would 
be an Islamic or secular state. 25 Most important of all, Asad was successful in giving 
the impression that he has been standing against the radical groups in the region. The 
arrival of Jihadists not only strengthened Asad’s hand in international platforms but 
also has provided one of the incentives for Washington and Tehran to start searching 
for common ground. Tehran was concerned about al-Qaida-affiliated groups in Syria 
as much as the United States is. 
 Ankara's approach to international politics in the Middle East was increasingly 
isolating Turkey in international platforms. This was most evident when Erdoğan 
reacted furiously against both the West and the Arab states over the military coup that 
ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, in early July 
2013.26 According to some analysts, because Turkish foreign policy is a “purely 
                                                
24 Halil M. Karaveli, Turkey, the Unelpful Ally, February 27, 2013,  The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/turkey-the-unhelpful-ally.html?_r=0 accessed 14 Oct. 
25 Semih Idiz, “Jihadists Alter the Syrian Equation, October 3, 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/jihadists-alter-the-syrian-
equation.aspx?pageID=449&nID=55566&NewsCatID=416 
26 Erdoğan was puzzled at Saudi officials’ support for the Egyptian coup and said: “How could a 
country claiming to uphold Islam a nd Sharia support the overthrow of an elected Islamist president 
who came to power after fair elections?” Al-Rasheed, M. 2013, ‘Saudi Arabia and Turkey Falter Over 
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ethics-based” rather than an “the interest based” one, it should be defined as a 
“precious loneliness/worthy solitude.” This precious loneliness 27 of Turkey became 
yet more visible when the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary 
of State John Kerry reached an agreement to secure and eliminate Syria's chemical 
weapons, although Obama had clearly declared that the United States would apply 
force if chemical weapons were used in the Syrian conflict, thereby averting an attack 
on Syria that Turkey had anticipated.28 Turkey welcomed the UNSC resolution 
adopted in New York and the US-Russian agreement on the destruction of chemical 
weapons, but it came as a shock for Ankara that Asad was not obliged to quit his 
position immediately although approximately 1300 Syrian people were gassed in 
August 2013. 29  Thus, Bashar al-Asad not only managed to stay in power but also 
averted a US attack with the help of Russian inspired diplomatic efforts. 
 In addition, the lack of any reference in the UN resolution to refugees or the 
humanitarian situation in the neighboring countries deepened Turkey’s existing 
uneasiness about the negligent attitude of the international community towards 
Turkey’s refugee problem.30  As the number of Syrian refugees which Turkey hosted 
in 21 refugee camps and the cost of those refugees as a result of Turkey’s open door 
policy increased with each passing day, Ankara demanded that the international 
community – and especially the European Union and the United States – be much 
                                                                                                                                      
Egypt’, Al-Monitor, 20 August, viewed 14 September 2013,    <http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/saudi-arabia-turkey-strained-relations.html> 
27 Adilgazi, L. 2013, ‘ ‘Zero Problems’ Policy Supplanted by ‘Precious Loneliness’ Approach’, 
Today’s Zaman, 25 August, viewed 14 September 2013,   <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
324415-zero-problems-policy-supplanted-by-precious-loneliness-approach.html> 
28 Chris Good, President Obama’s Red Line; What He Actually Said about Syria and Chemical 
Weapons, ABC News, August 26, 2013,  http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/08/president-
obamas-red-line-what-he-actually-said-about-syria-and-chemical-weapons/ accessed 15 Oct. 2013. 
29 Dominic Evans and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria Gas Kills Hundreds Security Council Meets, 
Reuters, August 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/us-syria-crisis-
idUSBRE97K0EL20130821 accessed 15 Oct 2013. 
30 Today’s Zaman, Davutoğlu Disappointed by UN Security Council Resolution,  September 30, 2013, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-327814-davutoglu-disappointed-by-un-security-council-
resolution.html accessed 19 Oct 2013. 
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more forthcoming in funding humanitarian assistance programs and live up to pledges 
made in the context of the UN’s Syria Regional Response Plan.31 
 In sum, Ankara made a lot of miscalculations in formulating its policies towards 
Syria by putting all its chips on a ‘non-Asad scenario’. For example, Turkey did not 
foresee that Washington would not favor a more Islamised Syria and would not 
consent to Asad’s replacement by the Muslim Brotherhood; especially after 
Mohammed Morsi came to power in Egypt this would have sandwiched Israel 
between two Ikhwan ruled countries, Egypt and Syria. Asad’s fall and his 
replacement by Islamist rule would not only endanger the security of Israel but also 
lead to radical groups’ control of chemical weapons existing in Syria.  In addition, in 
the post Iraqi war period, the Obama Administration did not want to get into another 
Middle East quagmire while struggling with its own economic problems in domestic 
politics. Another important miscalculation of Turkey concerned the power of anti 
Ikhwan regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates. 
Erdogan, while voicing allegations that it was Israel that organised and supported the 
military coup in Egypt, publically disregarded the fact that Saudi Arabia also 
supported the army against the Ikhwan.32 
 Lastly, Ankara did not take into account that Russia would not give up supporting 
Syria, for several reasons. First, Syria is the only country where Moscow enjoys a 
naval outlet on the Mediterranean. Russia currently has a naval installation in Tartus, 
which is strategically important and Russia’s last foreign military base outside the 
former Soviet Union.  Second, the Syrian uprising has clearly shown that Russia still 
acts in accordance with a Cold War mentality in seeking to prevent Syria from falling 
under Western control. Most important of all, Ankara did not foresee that Iran would 
prove so tenacious in supporting the Asad regime in Syria in an attempt to protect the 
“Shiite crescent,” to support a valuable ally in the Arab world, and as a convenient 
conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The divergence between Turkey and Iran over 
Syria acquired a sectarian dimension: Tehran viewed the rebellion against the Asad 
regime as a Sunni uprising against minority Alawites, an outlier sect of Shi’ism, 
whereas Ankara backed a Sunni party, the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Ankara 
                                                
31 Kemal Kirişçi, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Limits of an Open Door Policy, Brookings, June 27, 
2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/27-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-kirisci 
acessed 19 oct. 2013. 
32 Serpil Çevikcan, Suriye, Mısır, Görünen Köy,  Milliyet, August 24, 2013. 
Syria Studies    
 
12 
 
and Tehran are nevertheless both pragmatic enough to manage their relationship and 
avoid falling into enmity over the crisis in Syria. 
 
 
The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Iran Relations 
Continuing amity in Turkey-Iran relations has rested on deepened interdependence on 
the basis of trade, security and politics to some extent mainly rooted in the expansion 
of relations throughout the 2000s. Erdoğan and Iranian President Ahmed-i Nejad, 
being reluctant to damage these relations, stated, in an October 2012 meeting in 
Azerbaijan, that they would seek ways of cooperation over the Syrian issue. While 
Tehran asked that Ankara broker negotiations between moderates from the opposition 
groups and the Asad regime, 33 Ankara wanted Iran to take a place in two different 
negotiating groups, one involving Turkey, Egypt and Iran, and one involving Turkey, 
Russia and Iran. Erdoğan openly stated his positive view about Iran’s cooperation in 
finding a solution to the Syrian issue.34 
 From Tehran’s perspective, the fear of encirclement by hostile neighboring 
countries is the main motive behind its policy of maintaining relations with Ankara 
and thus to secure its frontier with Turkey. Apart from the patriot missiles deployed 
on Turkish territories, Washington’s deployment of missiles in Qatar set alarm bells 
ringing in Tehran.  Not only did the expanded American military presence in the Gulf 
exacerbate Iranian security concerns, but developments such as bilateral visits 
between the Turkish and Saudi Chiefs of Staff in November 2012 and the signing of a 
military agreement between Turkey and Qatar in July 2012 also made Tehran fear 
that a new Sunni axis was being formed against it by neighboring countries.35 To 
avert this, Tehran wanted not only to maintain a cordial relationship with Turkey but 
also to mend relations with Egypt under Morsi; Ahmed-i Nejad became the first 
Iranian president to visit Egypt, an important US ally, since the Islamic revolution.36 
                                                
33 “İran: Suriye Konusunda Türkiye’yle Uyumluyuz,” Milliyet, 8 Ocak 2013. 
34 “Esad’a Karşı İran’ı İşbirliğine Çağırdı,”  Milliyet, 17 Ekim 2012. 
35 Semih İdiz, “Turkey’s Secterian War over Syria and Iraq,”  Al-Monitor Turkey,, January 4, 2013 
36 “Mısır Dışişleri Bakanı Kemal Amr, ziyaret esnasında   Körfez ülkelerinin güvenliği Mısır’ın kırmızı 
çizgisi olduğunu söyleyerek İran’la yakınlaşma olmadığı sinyalini vermiştir.” İran Lideri İlk Kez 
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 Secondly, Iran could not afford to lose the Turkish gas market, which became 
increasingly important at a time when the Iranian economy was under the severest 
sanctions ever applied in its history. Because both sides developed relatively 
interdependent trade and energy relations throughout the 2000s, officials from Iran 
and Turkey were determined to sustain trade relations despite diverging interests in 
Syria and Iraq. For example, in October 2012, Erdoğan stated at a meeting with 
Iranian vice-president, Mohammed Reza Rahimi, that the volume of Iranian-Turkish 
trade would increase from 16.5 billion dollar to 30 billion dollar.37  This statement is 
noteworthy with respect to understanding Ankara’s uneasiness about the sanctions 
applied on Iran by the UN since 2010. The sanctions obstructed purchase of Iranian 
natural gas, which provided 20% of Turkey’s natural gas needs. In addition, Turkish 
business circles were increasingly uneasy about the double standards applied by the 
United States, which they believed, bypassed the sanctions and covertly exported its 
goods to Iran.38 “At the insistence of the Obama administration, in 2012 Turkey 
reduced its imports of oil from Iran; at the same time, however, it began selling gold 
to the country to circumvent the difficulties associated with payments in dollars.”39 
The tension between Turkey and the United States was heightened with Obama’s 
Executive order 13622 prohibiting the export of gold and “other precious metals” to 
the Islamic Republic.40 However, currently, the Obama Administration has declined 
to issue any sanctions pursuant to the order in the face of growing tension between 
Turkey and the United States. Ankara is still Tehran’s largest export market for 
natural gas.” 41 
                                                
37 Seda Kırdar, ABD’nin İran’a Uyguladığı Altın Yaptırımı  ve Olası Sonuçları, Türkiye Ekonomi 
Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (TEPAV), Nisan 2013, s. 2. 
38 Sabah, “Asıl ABD İran’la Ticareti Kessin,” 1 Aralık 2012. 
39 In fact, Turkey’s gold exports to Iran significantly reduced its balance of payments deficits in the 
first six months of 2012. See Guliyeva and Pak, ‘What’s Iran doing with Turkish Gold?’; and ‘Gold 
Sales to Iran and Economic Slowdown Curb Turkey Trade Deficit’, The Daily Star, 1 August 2012 in 
Barkey, p. 146. 
40 Serkan Demirtaş, Türkiye-ABD Arasında Altın Gerginliği,  BBC Türkçe, 5 Aralık 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2012/12/121205_us_turkey_gold.shtml 
41Robert Zarate, Patrick Christy, FPI Bulletein, Obama and Congress must Max Out Iran Sanctions 
Now,” The Foreign Policy Initiative, May 14, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-
bulletin-obama-and-congress-must-max-out-iran-sanctions%E2%80%94now accessed 24 Oct. 
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 From Turkey’s perspective, a further important reason for maintaining the 
bilateral relations with Iran is its escalating security concerns from the spill over 
effect of the Syrian civil war, which became evident with the attacks on Akçakale, 
Cilvegözü ve Reyhanlı.42  Put differently, at a time when the NATO general secretary 
Rasmussen openly stated, “NATO can not act like the policeman of the world,” 43 
Ankara, whose economy and border security were increasingly under threat because 
of the refugee flood and bomb attacks, could not depend on the West and needed 
diversified relations with its important Iranian neighbor. Despite occasional outbreaks 
of crisis, both sides quickly contained and ameliorated bilateral relations through 
diplomatic channels.  For example, in the face of Iranian Chief of General Staff’s 
threats concerning the patriots missiles deployed on Turkish territories, Davutoglu 
“reassured his Iranian counterpart, Ali-Akbar Salehi, during a joint news conference 
in Tehran in January 2012 that Turkey would never take any step that could 
negatively affect the relations with Iran and he said:  “We will never accept any 
attack on any of our neighbors from our soil. We don't want such a perception of 
threat to exist, especially against Iran.” In return, Salehi put the remarks of the IRGC 
general in context, underlining that “some people, knowingly or not, express views 
without much knowledge and by stepping beyond their responsibilities, and it causes 
misunderstandings.” 44 
 None of this means that the Turkey-Iran bilateral relations are problem- free. On 
the contrary, leaving aside the proxy war in Syria, rivalry over filling the gap in Iraq 
after US withdrawal has affected Turkish-Iranian relations in a negative way. While 
Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan improved, especially on the basis of energy 
and trade, thereby strengthening Iraqi Kurdistan’s capacity to act independently of 
Baghdad, Iran promoted its sphere of influence in Baghdad and especially in the 
South of Iraq. The Shiite-based central government is also of crucial importance for 
Iran to maintain its sphere of influence in Syria since Iranian arms flow to Syria take 
place via Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government supports the Asad regime by hosting 
                                                
42 Reyhanlı’da Katliam: 43 Ölü, Milliyet, 12 Mayıs 2013. Murat yetkin, Suriye Savaşı kapımıza 
Dayandı, Radikal, July 18, 2013. 
43 Reuters, “NATO to Stay out of Syria Even If UN Mandate Emerges”, 17 Şubat 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/us-syria-nato-idUSTRE81G0ZF20120217  
44  Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Turkey & Iran: Islamic Brotherhood or Regional Rivalry?, AlJazeera, 
June 4, 2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/05/20135139554264452.htm.  
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visits by Syrian officials, signing pacts to expand business ties and offering political 
support to help the Asad regime to cope with its isolation from other Arab League 
members. Turkey was labeled as "a hostile state" and accused of interfering in the 
internal affairs of Iraq by the Maliki government. Turkey’s rapprochement with the 
Iraqi Kurdistan was perceived as a Turkish plot against the unity of Iraq.  For 
example, that Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan signed a pipeline agreement45 which would 
transfer one million barrel crude oil via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline came as a 
shock to the Baghdad government since this agreement was perceived by Maliki as 
Erbil’s breaking away with the central government. 46 
 Another area of competition between Iran and Turkey also become more visible 
after the outburst of the Arab spring. For example, Erdoğan’s growing popularity in 
the Arab street, and his travel to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya five days before the 
opening of Iran’s Islamic Awakening Conference and his message of secular 
democracy were perceived by Tehran as an attempt to undermine Iran’s regional soft 
power.47 Erdoğan’s message was harshly criticised by Tehran on the grounds that 
Turkey’s model of “secular Islam” was a version of western liberal democracy and 
unacceptable for countries going through an “Islamic awakening.” 48 From a different 
angle, Erdoğan’s Arab tour and his words encouraging the Arab streets to be more 
democratised automatically touched the sensitive chords of Iranian political elite 
                                                
45 El Arabiya, Iraqi Kurdistan Poised to Pipe Oil to World via Turkey,”  17 Nisan 2013, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/energy/2013/04/17/Iraqi-Kurdistan-poised-to-pipe-oil-to-
world-via-Turkey.html 
46 Denge Azad, Cengiz Çandar: Kürdistan petrolü, Türkiye, Ortadoğu jeopolitiği 24 Nisan 2013. 
47 Hürriyet Daily News, Erdoğan Offers “Arab Spring” neo-Laicism,” September 15, 2011, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=erdogan-offers-8216arab-spring8217-
neo-laicism-2011-09-15 accessed 23 Oct. 
48 Henry J. Barkey, Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, vol. 54, no.6, December 2012- January 2013, s. 154. Iran who was caught off guard with the 
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whose survival had been endangered by big mass protests only a couple of years 
previously. 49 
 The beginning of Rouhani’s moderate Iranian diplomacy, however, offered a 
good opportunity for a new beginning with Turkey so as to reduce the existing 
tension stemming from the Syria crisis. Indeed, it had already become apparent that 
Ankara could no longer afford, for various reasons, to continue its policy of putting 
all its chips on a non-Asad scenario. First of all, the possibility that the al-Qaeda-
linked Jabhat al-Nusra and the ISIS could eventually grow too strong to control and 
threaten Turkey prompted Ankara to seek more cooperative relations with Iran. An 
internationalised sectarian conflict on its longest border might stoke a dangerous 
escalation on Turkey’s domestic politics tensions, particularly  the Sunni-Alevi 
divide. In a similar vein, Tehran, shared with Turkey perception of a threat from a 
probable emergence of de facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria under the 
leadership of the Democratic Union Party, linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party 
along at least 400 km of the Turkish border. 50 In a nutshell, Turkey, wary of a 
“Pakistanisation” of its border provinces, and Tehran, pressurised on its nuclear 
efforts and its economy by the international community, had incentives to improve 
relations. 
 Two important developments in 2013-2014 seemed likely to further affect 
bilateral relations between the two countries. One was the interim nuclear deal signed 
in Geneva in November 2013 between Iran and the six world powers which mainly 
aimed to normalise Iran’s relations with the outside world. First of all, the Geneva 
agreement gave international recognition to Iran’s right to continue uranium 
enrichment for peaceful purposes and Iran’s economy earned a relief of $ 7 billion. 
While this was welcomed by Ankara, the de facto recognition of Iran’s right to the 
full nuclear fuel cycle came at a time when Turkey’s nuclear energy program was still 
in its early infancy. This will not only elevate Iran’s international prestige but also 
lead to imbalance between the two countries on the energy and security levels. 
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 The second was the advance of ISIS to Mosul and Telafer and the accompanying 
exacerbation of the sectarian war in Iraq. Because, after the outbreak of the Syrian 
crisis, Ankara came to believe that an Iranian-led Shiite axis was forming to its South, 
extending from Iraq into Syria, it looked for allies to counter that axis, including the 
KRG some of the GCC states and Iraq’s Sunni Arab population.51 While many 
analysts still accused Turkey of allowing its Syria border to become a two-way 
“jihadist highway” facilitating the passage of thousands of international Sunni 
jihadists to Syria 52 Iran, after the ISIS advance, came to be seen by the US as a 
regional actor that could restore security in Iraq. At a time when a hot debate about 
probable US-Iranian cooperation in tackling advances by Sunni insurgents in Iraq 
started, Turkey’s role in the fight against “terrorism” was sidelined despite its NATO 
membership and alliance with the West. This shows that Turkey’s failure in Syria as 
well as Iraq is mainly due to its pro-Sunni policies which damaged not only its newly 
formulated good neighborhood relations but also provoked its own Sunni-Alawite 
divergence in domestic Turkish politics as evident during the Gezi protests. Iran’s 
rising status as a counterbalancing power against Sunni radicalism and Washington-
Tehran rapprochement over Iraq might come at the expense of Turkey’s role in the 
region. 
 
Conclusion 
Syria had been the jewel in the crown of Davutoglu’s policy of “zero problems with 
neighbors” and the accompanying ambition to substitute Turkish leadership for 
Western over-involvement in the Middle East;’53 as such the, Syrian civil war not 
only devastated Turkey’s zero problem policy but also exposed its limited capability 
to act in the Middle East independently from the West, particularly, the United States. 
 Since the beginning of the new century, Turkey, assuming that the unipolar 
international system was being replaced by a multipolar one, had focused on regional 
policies and improved its relations with Syria and Iran in an unprecedented way. 
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Ankara firmly believed that the pax Americana was ending with major changes in 
international order, such as the rise of China as a global power. In parallel with this, 
Turkey criticised and demanded the reform of the international order in many area 
such as trade, finance, nonproliferation and human rights. 54  Turkey’s growing 
alignment with what Washington deemed to be ‘rogue states,’ Syria and Iran, should 
be read against this background. 
 However, the Arab spring and Syrian revolt exposed Turkey’s misreading of  
regional dynamics, its exaggeration of its own capacity to take a leadership role in the 
region and most important of all, Turkey’s Achilles heals, Kurdish separatism and the 
Sunni-Alevi cleavage.  Syria’s civil war also brought the fragility of Turkish-Iranian 
relations to the surface. Despite the increasing trade and energy relations between the 
two countries, the transformation of the Syrian conflict from one initiated by the 
masses against a dictatorial rule into one between the Sunni jihadists and Alawites/ 
secularists and its spread to Iraq especially after the advance of ISIS, upset the 
balance between the two countries. Both Iran and Turkey appeared to have carved out 
respective spheres of influence at opposite ends of Iraq. Tehran extended its influence 
throughout southern Iraq. Turkey, by contrast, has consolidated its economic and 
political influence in the Kurdish regions of the north at the expense of its relations 
with Baghdad and Tehran. Ankara even went further and remained silent when the 
Iraqi Kurdistan took control of Kirkuk in order to stop the advance of ISIS in the 
region although Kirkuk had traditionally been Turkey’s red line regarding Kurdish 
aggrandizement in Iraq. 
 Only a couple of years ago, following the Arab spring, Turkey was seen as a 
successful country because it demonstrated that democracy and Islam could coexist. 
However the Syrian revolt and its aftermath destroyed Turkey’s popularity in the 
Arab world mainly because of Turkey’s abandoning of its previous policy of 
equidistance between the regions sectarian poles by allowing passages of Sunni 
jihadist groups from Turkey to Syria. Owing to these policies of Ankara, Iran 
achieved a rising status as a counterweight to the spread of Sunni insurgency and 
Asad  remained in power as a leader standing against the radical Jihadist groups  in 
the eyes of the West. 
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 The Syrian crisis also crystallised the fragility of Turkey’s relations with the 
West, especially the United States. For example, while conventional wisdom had it 
that the usage of chemical weapon would be a cause for US intervention in the region 
and Turkey was expecting it in Syria, US Secretary of State John Kerry praised 
Bashar Asad because he quickly started the process of destroying his regime's 
chemical weapons arsenal. Apart from this, Turkey was disappointed by the EU’s and 
US’ indifference to Turkey’s struggle with the Syrian refugees whose numbers has 
exceeded over 1.000.000. 
 To sum up, the Syrian crisis and its aftermath have prompted Turkey to modify its 
previous overambitious policies so as to restore its deteriorating image and to deal 
with the consequences of the Syrian crisis, including a sectarian based war in its 
neighborhood, border security, economic problems stemming from a loss of  Arab 
markets, deteriorating relations with Iraq and clashing interests with Iran. All these 
expose the negative impact of the Syrian civil war on Turkey. 
